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A PRESUMPTION AGAINST AGENCY PREEMPTION 
Nina A. Mendelson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though 
state law is not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer.  
Starting in 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is-
sued several notices saying that state laws would apply to national bank op-
erating subsidiaries (incorporated under state law) to the same extent as 
those laws applied to the parent national bank.  In 2003, the OCC specifi-
cally mentioned state consumer protection laws and took the position that 
the state laws were preempted and did not apply to mortgage lenders owned 
by national banks.1  In December 2006, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity declared its own authority to preempt state law on high-risk chemical 
plant security, announcing a procedure by which interested parties could 
apply to see if state law would be preempted.2  In both cases, states re-
sponded angrily.  In the OCC case, the attorneys general of every state filed 
Supreme Court briefs opposing the agency’s position in Watters v. Wacho-
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  This Article benefited greatly from par-
ticipants’ comments at a conference at Duke University School of Law, “Federalism and the Overlap-
ping Territory,” cosponsored by the Center for Progressive Reform and the American Constitution 
Society, and a symposium at Northwestern University School of Law, “Ordering State-Federal Relations 
Through Federal Preemption Doctrine.”  The author gives special thanks for useful comments and dis-
cussions to Michael Barr, William Buzbee, Riyaz Kanji, Gillian Metzger, and Catherine Sharkey.  
Thanks to Jessica Berry for excellent research assistance and to the Cook Fund at the University of 
Michigan Law School for research support. 
1  See Investment Securities; Bank Activities Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 
2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1, 7, 23 (2002)); Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 
46,264, 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003) (specifically stating that Georgia consumer protection law is preempted).  
The OCC has taken the position that it was merely consolidating earlier guidance or other statements on 
preemption, see, e.g., Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2005)) (visitorial powers); Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and 
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–7.4009, 34.3–34.4 
(2005)) (national bank activities).   
2  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 (Dec. 28, 2006) 
(proposed rule).  In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Congress had provided the De-
partment of Homeland Security with interim authorization to regulate the security of high-risk chemical 
facilities by setting “risk-based” standards, but that legislation dodged the question whether state author-
ity to regulate those facilities would be affected.  See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 
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via Bank, N.A.3  A joint brief filed by the National Conference on State Leg-
islatures and the National Governors Association, also opposing the 
agency’s position, argued that federal counterparts to state consumer protec-
tion laws were not adequate.4  In response to the Department of Homeland 
Security, the state of New Jersey asserted its right to address risks presented 
by the seven high-risk chemical facilities located within its borders, more 
facilities than in any other state.5  Recent events have overtaken both 
agency actions.  In the OCC case, the Supreme Court ruled that the relevant 
banking statutes were preemptive, mooting the impact of the agency action.6  
The Department of Homeland Security backed off its preemptive position 
to some degree in response to congressional pressure, especially from the 
New Jersey delegation, and ultimately Congress legislated a limited savings 
clause for state chemical facility security laws.7  The examples nonetheless 
remain significant because the agencies attempted to preempt state law. 
 
3  127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).  The state of Michigan challenged the agency’s position directly; the other 
forty-nine states and Puerto Rico filed a joint amicus brief in support of Michigan’s position.  See Brief 
of States of New York, Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 
(No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570992.  
4  See Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors’ Association, et 
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 
2570993 (describing the OCC’s record on consumer protection as “lax” and “unimpressive” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brief of American Association of Retired Persons, et 
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 
2570989 (arguing that OCC consumer protection enforcement is “extremely weak” compared with state 
enforcement).  Admittedly, the OCC has issued some nonbinding guidance to national banks on preda-
tory practices.  See Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending 
Practices, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
advisory/2003-2.pdf; Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased 
Loans, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
advisory/2003-3.pdf; OCC Guidelines Establishing Standards for Residential Mortgage Lending Prac-
tices, 70 Fed. Reg. 6329, 6330 (Feb. 7, 2005) (citing both advisory letters). 
5  For example, in congressional debate regarding whether to adopt the bill authorizing the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security to regulate chemical-facility-related terrorism risks, which lacked a savings 
clause protecting state law, New Jersey Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. noted that the bill “fails to pro-
tect the rights of States like my own, New Jersey, to implement stronger security requirements at chemi-
cal plants.”  152 CONG. REC. H7911 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).  After the Department of Homeland 
Security issued its rule, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg of New Jersey commented, “Last year, New Jersey 
required that chemical facilities adopt a practice known as inherently safer technology. . . .  But last 
week, the Bush administration sent a signal that it wants to override the right of States to require inher-
ently safer technology. . . .  This approach is wrong.”  152 CONG. REC. S2606 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2006).  
6  The Supreme Court ruled in the OCC case that congressional intent was to preempt state consumer 
protection laws, so the agency’s ruling merely “clarif[ied] and confirm[ed]” existing law.  Watters, 127 
S. Ct. at 1572. 
7  Responding to sharp congressional pressure, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security wrote Con-
gress that the Department would drop its claim to authority to preempt state law.  Associated Press, U.S. 
Won’t Override State Rules on Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at A17 (reporting on a letter from the 
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, which indicated that the Department of Home-
land Security would not seek to preempt “stricter state rules already in place”).  At the very end of 2007, 
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Meanwhile, agencies have increasingly included preemptive statements 
in preambles to agency rulemaking documents.  These have ranged from a 
January 2006 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statement that failure-
to-warn claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers are preempted be-
cause such claims could require more information on a drug label than the 
FDA requires, to a Transportation Department statement that states could 
not require any greater safety than its own “roof crush” standards for auto-
mobiles.8  In all of these cases, the statute includes no language preempting 
state law. 
The agency statements are, of course, aimed at limiting the application 
of state statutes, regulations, and common law.  In so doing, the agencies 
are staking a claim to federal authority over safety, health, the environment, 
or consumer protection.  Federal preemption of state law is nothing new.  
Congress has long acted to preempt the application of state law and to limit 
state authority.  In deciding preemption cases, as well as cases under the 
Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment, courts 
have refereed the distribution of authority between the federal government 
and the states.9 
                                                                                                                           
Congress amended its earlier enactment authorizing the Department to regulate chemical plant security 
to save state law.  The amendment stated: 
This section shall not preclude or deny any right of a State or political subdivision thereof to adopt 
or enforce any regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with respect to chemical facil-
ity security that is more stringent than a regulation, requirement, or standard of performance issued 
under this section, or otherwise impair any right or jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemi-
cal facilities within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between this section and the law of 
that State. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 534, 121 Stat. 1844, 2075 (2007) 
(amending Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, § 550) (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. 
§ 121 note). 
8  See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biologi-
cal Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601 (2007)) 
(“FDA approval of labeling under the [A]ct, whether it be in the old or new format, preempts conflicting 
or contrary State law.”); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 
49,223, 49,245–46 (Aug. 23, 2005) (proposed rule) (“[T]he agency believes that either a broad State per-
formance requirement for greater levels of roof crush resistance or a narrower requirement mandating 
that increased roof strength be achieved by a particular specified means, would frustrate the agency’s 
objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propen-
sity. . . .  [I]f the proposal were adopted as a final rule, it would preempt all conflicting State common 
law requirements, including rules of tort law.”); see also Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter 
Human Use, 72 Fed. Reg. 49,070, 47,109–10 (Aug. 27, 2007) (suggesting that proposed sunscreen regu-
lation will preempt both state regulations and state common law claims); Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards; Front End Strength of Cab Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,016, 42,036 
(Aug. 1, 2007) (suggesting that its equipment safety standards should preempt state statutory, regulatory, 
and common law standards). 
9  E.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 
(2001) (declining to find that agency is authorized to regulate isolated waters because of concerns of “al-
ter[ing] the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state 
power.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756–57 (1999) (defining which state institutions can assert 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) 
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The recent events described above, however, suggest a change.  In the 
context of preemption, federal administrative agencies increasingly seem to 
claim for themselves the authority to distribute power between the federal 
government and the states.  Agencies have sought to preempt state law in 
notice-and-comment rules and have also issued statements with the appar-
ent goal of influencing later judicial decisions on whether state law is pre-
empted by a federal statute. 
These recent events bring home the need to address whether agency 
preemption of state law is legitimate.  Congress might directly answer the 
question by expressly confirming or limiting the authority of agencies to 
preempt state law.10  Congress has occasionally explicitly done just this, as 
with its express delegation of authority to the Secretary of Transportation to 
determine whether particular state standards bearing on hazardous materials 
transportation are preempted.11 
Courts have tended to treat agency statements on preemption as al-
ready-authorized “legal interpretations” to which some level of deference 
might be due.12  In an earlier article, Chevron and Preemption, I argued that 
agency interpretations of preemptive statutory language should not receive 
a presumption of deference under the doctrine of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,13 but that deference should instead be 
much more limited, following the approach of Mead v. United States14 and 
Skidmore v. Swift.15  Despite agencies’ expertise in implementing their own 
programs, no presumptive deference should be due because agencies lack 
both institutional expertise on important issues of state autonomy and fed-
eralism and adequate statutory guidance regarding preemption questions.16  
Where, as in these cases, the authorizing statute only delegates author-
ity generally, and does not contain language specifically addressing pre-
emption of state law, an antecedent question ought to be examined: Does 
the agency possess the authority to preempt state law?  The answer to this 
                                                                                                                           
(striking down legislation as commandeering state resources in violation of the Tenth Amendment); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1995) (characterizing the Commerce Clause as critical to 
ensuring some “limit to the federal power”); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
547–55 (1985) (adopting “political safeguards” approach to Tenth Amendment analysis).   
10  Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, Congress may “preempt state law if it 
chooses.”  Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000).  
11  See 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2000).  That section authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to hear 
and decide applications on whether a particular state standard is “substantively the same” as federal law 
and thus exempt from statutory preemption provisions.  Id. 
12  The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. took this line.  See 431 F.3d 556, 
560 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining an invitation to examine a specific authorization to an agency to preempt 
and instead using the Chevron framework), aff’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). 
13  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
14  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
15  323 U.S. 134 (1944).  See Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 
789 & n.214, 797–98 (2004).  
16  Mendelson, supra note 15, at 779–94. 
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question should both resolve whether a notice-and-comment rule can effect 
state law preemption and relate to whether deference is due to a less formal 
agency position.  For example, the Department of Homeland Security 
claimed in its chemical plant security rule that it did not need express statu-
tory authorization to declare state law preempted.17 
For these sorts of problems, especially with respect to a statute that 
contains no explicit preemptive language, I suggest that courts should apply 
not only a presumption against preemption, but also an additional presump-
tion against agency preemption.  We should not assume that Congress au-
thorized a federal agency to preempt state law unless that authority is 
clearly delegated. 
Some of the arguments I developed in Chevron and Preemption sup-
port a presumption against agency preemption.  For example, the institu-
tional focus of agencies makes them particularly ill-suited to consider state 
autonomy to regulate or federalism concerns.  Further, agencies may have a 
particular stake in validating their own policy decisions that makes them 
less willing to consider the validity of a different balance struck by state 
regulators.18 
Beyond the lack of institutional competence, I suggest some additional 
reasons in support of a presumption against agency preemption.  Current 
approaches to so-called obstacle preemption,19 in the context of modern 
regulatory law, could give an agency the discretion to preempt nearly any 
state law relevant to the agency’s regulatory program.  Besides undermining 
state regulatory autonomy and the functions it may serve, such an outcome 
seems very unlikely to have been intended by Congress.  Moreover, not 
only would agencies that preempt state law lack appropriate institutional 
competence, they would also do so in the absence of adequate guidance 
from Congress regarding state interests and federalism.  This risks exces-
sive interference with state regulatory autonomy.  Finally, this outcome 
risks undermining the legitimacy of administrative agency decisions.  Part 
II of this Article describes recent agency efforts to preempt state law.  Part 
III presents arguments in favor of a presumption against agency preemp-
tion.  Part IV briefly concludes. 
II. RECENT AGENCY EFFORTS TO PREEMPT STATE LAW  
The various preemptive efforts by agencies can be most easily under-
stood by placing them in the context of the current judicial approach to pre-
emption.  Under current preemption analysis, state law yields to federal 
 
17  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,726 (Apr. 9, 2007) (to 
be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule) (suggesting that, despite congressional inaction on the preemp-
tion question, agencies are empowered to “fill those gaps” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)). 
18  Mendelson, supra note 15. 
19  See infra text accompanying note 23 (describing obstacle preemption).   
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law, consistent with the Supremacy Clause,20 if the federal statute contains 
explicit language preempting the state law.21  Besides such “express pre-
emption,” a court may also find state law preempted if Congress has sug-
gested that the federal government will “occupy the field,” as it does with 
regulation of immigration.22  Finally, a court may find state law impliedly 
preempted if it directly conflicts with federal law—if compliance with both 
state and federal law is a physical impossibility—or if state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals, which I term “obstacle 
preemption.”23 
The types of preemption that raise the greatest concern about agency 
authority are agency declarations either of field preemption or of obstacle 
preemption.  In both cases, there may have been no direct congressional 
consideration of state interests or federalism in the underlying statute.  By 
contrast, when an agency interprets express preemption language in a stat-
ute, Congress has already expressly made some sort of preemption decision, 
so the agency is not writing on a blank slate.24  Direct conflict preemption 
between state law and an agency rule also raises less concern.  When it is 
physically impossible to comply with both a substantive agency rule and 
state law, it is reasonable to assume that Congress would want a properly 
authorized agency action to be effective, and thus to trump directly conflict-
ing state law.25  For the most part, agencies have not attempted to declare 
that federal law “occupies the field.”  Instead, their actions have been of the 
obstacle preemption variety—a statement by the agency that a particular 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals.26  As 
 
20  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
21  See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (“[T]he pre-emptive language of [the 
relevant statute] means we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended 
the MDA to pre-empt at least some state law . . . , [though] we must nonetheless ‘identify the domain 
expressly pre-empted’ by that language . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
22  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941). 
23  See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873–74 (2000). 
24  I argue elsewhere that agency interpretations of preemptive language nonetheless should not re-
ceive Chevron deference from courts.  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 797–98. 
25  Properly authorized federal agency rules are deemed to have the “force of law,” just like a statute 
does.  See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (declaring that courts must give the force 
of law to properly issued substantive agency regulations).  Under the Supremacy Clause, state law ac-
cordingly must yield.  E.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“Federal 
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.”); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 
374, 382 (1961) (holding that a validly issued Veterans’ Administration regulation preempted conflict-
ing state law).  An interesting question, but one beyond the scope of this Article, is whether special evi-
dence of congressional intent might be required to evaluate an agency’s authority in the case where the 
agency could have chosen between two equally effective approaches to implement a statute, and one ap-
proach preempts state law while the other does not. 
26  An agency declaration of “field preemption” is not out of the question, however.  The Department 
of Homeland Security, for now, has declined to claim that its chemical plant security regulations occupy 
the field.  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,727 (Apr. 9, 2007) 
102:695  (2008) A Presumption Against Agency Preemption 
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discussed in greater detail below, such claims of obstacle preemption can 
eventually amount to complete preemption of related state laws. 
It is worth looking at a few such agency actions in detail.  As the Intro-
duction mentions, in late December 2006, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity issued a proposed chemical plant security rule stating that it 
possessed the authority to declare a state law preempted, despite Congress’s 
initial decision not to resolve the question whether the agency possessed 
preemption authority.27  The underlying statute, the Homeland Security Ap-
propriations Act of 2007, gave the Department of Homeland Security in-
terim authorization to regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities 
by setting “risk-based” standards; prior to the addition of a savings clause 
the following year, the statute did not speak expressly to state law preemp-
tion.28  New Jersey, meanwhile, which has seven high-risk chemical plants 
within its borders, is requiring a wide variety of chemical plant operators to 
consider using “inherently safer technologies” in order to minimize the im-
pact of any successful terrorism effort.29  In the proposed rule, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security took the position that it needed to be able to 
balance terrorism risk reduction against flexibility, and it reserved the right 
(on request from a chemical facility or a state) to declare preempted any 
state law striking a different balance.30  The rule incorporated a “preemption 
procedure.”31  Clearly contemplated in the rule was the prospect of a state 
terrorism risk reduction law being preempted because it is not adequately 
“flexible.”  In response to political pressure from the New Jersey congres-
sional delegation, the Department of Homeland Security, in its interim final 
rule, issued in April 2007, backed off to some degree32 by stating, “While 
we have not canvassed all existing state laws and regulations, currently we 
have no reason to conclude that any such non-Federal measure is being ap-
plied in a way that would impede the performance standards or other provi-
                                                                                                                           
(to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule) (“The Department does not view its regulatory scheme as 
one which so fully occupies the field as to pre-empt any state law . . . .”). 
27  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 (Dec. 28, 2006) 
(proposed rule). 
28  See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550, 
120 Stat. 1355 (2006).  A savings clause was added in the 2008 appropriations legislation.  See supra 
note 7. 
29  See Ben Geman, N.J. Sets New Rules, as Congress Eyes Federal Authority, E&E NEWS, Mar. 16, 
2007. 
30  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. at 78,293. 
31  See id. at 78,302 (proposed language for 6 C.F.R. § 27.405).   
32  This course of events might perhaps illustrate a different point as well.  Perhaps any truly signifi-
cant federalism issues raised by federal preemption can simply be raised through the political process, 
and no presumption against preemption is required to protect state regulatory autonomy from agency 
incursion.  If so, however, this argument would also eliminate the basis for a presumption against pre-
emption.   
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sions of Section 550 and this Interim Final Rule.”33  The Department de-
clined to state with any greater clarity what sort of state law might be pre-
empted in the future, but it nonetheless set up a submissions procedure that 
would result in the Department issuing opinions on whether particular state 
laws might, among other things, “frustrate” federal objectives.34 
In 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a rule 
stating that state laws generally would not apply to national bank operating 
subsidiaries, including subsidiaries engaged in real estate lending.35  It am-
plified that with more particular statements, including a 2003 determination 
that the Georgia Fair Lending Act, as well as state consumer protection 
laws more generally, would not apply to national banks’ real estate lending, 
and finally, a 2004 notice-and-comment rule specifying which state laws 
would and would not apply to national banks and operating subsidiaries.36  
Many states had enacted predatory mortgage lending laws, in addition to 
other consumer protection laws, and they wished to apply these laws to all 
entities engaged in mortgage lending, including national bank subsidiaries 
(incorporated under state law).  Meanwhile, the OCC’s own regulation of 
banks to protect consumers had faced some sharp criticism.37  In issuing the 
2003 preemption notice, the agency did not rely on the structure or lan-
guage of the National Bank Act but instead on its general statutory author-
ity to prescribe “restrictions and requirements” on real estate lending by 
regulation or order.38  The OCC reasoned that it already regulated “preda-
tory and abusive lending practices,”39 and that permitting further state law 
requirements would “obstruct, or for practical purposes, prevent, national 
banks from making certain types of real estate loans, causing an overall re-
duction in credit available to subprime borrowers. . . . [possibly including] 
creditworthy subprime borrowers.”40  The agency struck its own balance be-
 
33  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,727 (Apr. 9, 2007) (to 
be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule). 
34  Id. at 17,739 (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. 27.405). 
35  See Investment Securities; Bank Activities Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 
(July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1, 7, 23 (2002)). 
36  See Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003); Bank Ac-
tivities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–7.4009, 34.3–34.4 (2005)) (national bank activities).  
37  See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority 
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 350–56 (2004) (suggesting that the OCC has not adequately acted on consum-
ers’ behalf).  The OCC itself acknowledged the criticism in its 2001 rule.  See Investment Securities; 
Bank Activities Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,788 (reporting comments that federal oversight 
of national bank operating subsidiaries is perceived as inadequate). 
38  12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000) (allowing real estate lending by national banking associations but 
“subject to . . . such restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by 
regulation or order”). 
39  See Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,269. 
40  See id. at 46,271. 
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tween increasing consumer protection and reducing the availability of 
credit, and decided that state laws striking a different balance should be 
preempted.  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court held that the National 
Bank Act was sufficient to preempt these state laws to the extent they might 
apply to national bank operating subsidiaries, including subsidiaries incor-
porated under state law.41  The OCC’s reasoning is nonetheless an instruc-
tive example.   
Other such efforts at agency preemption have followed a similar sort of 
analysis, although they may have appeared in preambles or other statements 
without the legal force of a notice-and-comment rule.  In January 2006, the 
Food and Drug Administration slipped a preemptive statement into the pre-
amble of its rulemaking on the format of prescription drug labels.  The 
statement says that the federal pharmaceutical regime preempts state agen-
cies and courts from requiring any additional information from pharmaceu-
tical companies besides what is on the federally approved label, whether 
through regulatory requirements for supplemental pharmaceutical safety in-
formation, such as disclosure of clinical test results, or through tort claims 
for failure to warn.42  The authorizing statute says nothing about preemp-
tion, and earlier FDA regulations contemplated manufacturers going be-
yond the initially approved label to strengthen warnings.43  In taking its 
2006 preemption position, however, the FDA reasoned that it was “expert,” 
and that its regulation was “comprehensive” and based on a thorough scien-
tific investigation of pharmaceutical risks.44  The FDA argued that it “inter-
prets the [A]ct to establish both a ‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling,’” barring states 
from requiring any further information not already on the FDA-approved 
label.45  The FDA suggested that more information might not necessarily be 
 
41  See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570–73 (2007).  
42  See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biologi-
cal Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (“FDA approval of labeling under the [A]ct, 
whether it be in the old or new format, preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”); see also id. at 3935 
(“Given the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of drug safety, effectiveness, and labeling under the 
[A]ct, additional [disclosure] requirements . . . are not necessarily more protective of patients.  Instead, 
they can erode and disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers 
need to make appropriate judgments about drug use.”). 
43  See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2005) (revised 2006) (“The labeling shall be revised to include a 
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug . . . .”); 
see also 21 C.F.R. 201.80(e) (2007) (same). 
44  Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. 
45  Id. at 3935.  The preamble statement contains careful caveats: “FDA believes that State laws con-
flict with and stand as an obstacle to achievement of the full objectives and purposes of [f]ederal law 
when they purport to compel a firm to include in labeling or advertising a statement that FDA has con-
sidered and found scientifically unsubstantiated.”  Id.  In this case, the drug might be considered mis-
branded.  Even if a drug would not be misbranded as a result of state law obligations, and even if the 
FDA has not specifically considered particular evidence that a state might wish a pharmaceutical com-
pany to include on a label, the FDA’s position appears to be that federal law preempts state claims “that 
a sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include contraindications or warnings that are not 
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“protective of patients,” but instead could “erode and disrupt the careful and 
truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to make 
appropriate judgments about drug use.  Exaggeration of risk could discour-
age appropriate use of a beneficial drug.”46 
In August 2005, the FDA wrote a letter to the California Attorney 
General.  The letter concerned the Attorney General’s lawsuit under Cali-
fornia’s Proposition 65 against tuna companies.  The lawsuit sought warn-
ing labels on tuna cans regarding mercury in tuna.  The FDA’s letter, which 
was copied to the judge in the suit, stated that although the FDA had posted 
warnings regarding mercury in tuna on its website, the FDA had deliber-
ately exercised its authority in a “nuanced” way in order to avoid “overex-
posing consumers to warnings.”47  It then took the position that California 
was federally preempted from requiring any further warnings because extra 
“Proposition 65 warnings [would] frustrate this . . . approach.”48  The judge 
deferred to the FDA’s position and dismissed the suit. 
That same month, the Transportation Department issued a proposed 
rule setting new “roof crush” safety standards for automobiles.49  In the pre-
amble to that proposed rule, the agency took the position that its proposed 
safety standards represented a “careful balance . . . among a variety of con-
siderations and objectives regarding rollover safety,” including other safety 
measures and costs.50  As a consequence, the agency reasoned that any dif-
ferent requirements at the state level—including state tort law—would un-
dermine agency goals and would thus be preempted.51 
                                                                                                                           
supported by evidence that meets the standards set forth in this rule,” including 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 201.57(c)(5) and (c)(7).  Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3936.  The former section requires inclusion of “known 
hazards”; the latter the inclusion of the “overall adverse reaction profile of the drug.”  The FDA’s posi-
tion assumes that “given the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of drug safety, effectiveness, and 
labeling under the [A]ct, additional requirements for the disclosure of risk information are not necessar-
ily more protective of patients.”  Id. at 3935. 
46  Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. 
47  See Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Administration to Bill Lockyer re a Suit Filed on June 21, 
2004, People of the State of California v. Tri-Union Seafoods (Aug. 12, 2005), available at 
www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/fl-ltr65.html. 
48  Id.  The letter also argued that the tuna cans might be considered misbranded under federal law if 
California required the labels, see id., a dubious position in view of the FDA’s own consumption adviso-
ries posted on the Internet for canned tuna.  The FDA has taken a similar position in a tort lawsuit 
brought by a mercury-poisoned woman, and the district court accepted the FDA’s view that state com-
mon law claims were preempted.  See Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods LLC, No. 07-1238, 2007 WL 
87633, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2007), appeal filed, No. 07-1238 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 2007) (pending; argued 
February 2008).  
49  See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223 (Aug. 
23, 2005) (proposed rule). 
50  Id. at 49,245. 
51  See id. at 49,245–46; see also Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mat-
tress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633 (2007)) (tak-
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In my earlier article, Chevron and Preemption, I argued that an 
agency’s interpretation of the scope of expressly preemptive statutory lan-
guage should not receive Chevron deference in the courts, largely because 
of concerns about institutional expertise.52  I did not, however, address the 
antecedent question that these cases present regarding the agency’s author-
ity to preempt.  In the examples above, the statute contains no language di-
rectly relating to the question of preemption, and there is no direct conflict, 
in the sense that compliance with both federal and state law is not a physi-
cal impossibility.53  The agency nonetheless declares through a rule or some 
other statement (such as a preamble or interpretive rule) that state law is 
impliedly preempted because it frustrates federal objectives.54  The primary 
aim of these rules and preambles is to “settle the scope of federal preemp-
tion.”55 
On review, courts have sometimes framed the relevant question as 
whether these actions merit application of the Chevron doctrine.56  Implicit 
in this framing is a judicial characterization of the agency’s decision (some-
times matched by the agency’s own express characterization) as an author-
ized legal interpretation to which some form of judicial deference—either 
Chevron or Mead-Skidmore deference—is due.  That was the case both in 
the lower court opinion and in the briefing filed in Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A., the 2006 case involving the OCC preemption of the application 
of state law to non-bank operating subsidiaries chartered under state law.57  
(As noted, the Watters Court did not, however, reach the question of what 
effect the agency interpretation should be given, finding instead that the 
statute clearly preempted state law.58). 
                                                                                                                           
ing position that the mattress standard preempts not only state “standards,” as provided by statute, but 
also state common law). 
52  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 779–91.   
53  E.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (defining conflict pre-
emption as including the situation where compliance with both state and federal law is a physical impos-
sibility).  
54  E.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) (accepting the agency’s argument 
that a tort claim for failure to install airbags would interfere with the federal goal of encouraging manu-
facturers to develop a “variety and mix” of safety devices); see also Gade, 505 U.S. at 102 (finding state 
worker safety laws impliedly preempted as conflicting with the federal goal of avoiding duplicative 
regulation, though not the federal goal of encouraging worker safety).  The contrast here is direct con-
flict preemption—where compliance with both a federal rule and a state law is impossible.  Under those 
circumstances, the federal rule clearly prevails.  This outcome seems consistent with congressional in-
tent that an agency’s regulations be effective. 
55  Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1583 n.24 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56  E.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2005) (framing the issue as a 
Chevron question), aff’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).   
57  See supra text accompanying notes 1, 3–4.  
58  See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571–72.  The Department of Homeland Security expressly took this 
line in its proposed chemical plant security rulemaking.  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Stan-
dards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,292–93 (Dec. 28, 2006) (proposed rule) (arguing that the “gap” in the 
statute is to be filled as the agency interprets the “ambiguit[ies],” and that Chevron deference is due).  
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This approach, however, too readily makes the assumption that an 
agency has some intrinsic power to preempt state law.  Before reaching the 
question whether an agency’s decision (or “interpretation”) should receive 
deference, a court should examine whether the agency is even authorized to 
preempt state law.  The approach would be analogous to that taken by the 
Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Oregon,59 the medical marijuana case.  In 
that case, the Court declined to defer to the agency, but instead concluded 
that the Attorney General’s rule prohibiting the use of prescribed drugs in 
connection with physician-assisted suicide was not authorized under the 
Controlled Substance Act’s limited rulemaking provisions.60 
Even for a preemptive statement that does not, like a rule, have the 
“force and effect of law,” the authority question is also relevant to how 
much attention a court should pay the agency statement.  For example, in 
United States v. Mead, the Supreme Court named the “agency’s generally 
conferred authority” as relevant to the extent of deference an agency’s legal 
interpretation will receive in court.61 
As discussed in greater detail below, the best approach is a presump-
tion against agency preemption.  I turn now to an examination of congres-
sional intent, institutional competence, and other concerns that, in my view, 
warrant the adoption of such a presumption. 
III. AGAINST THE AUTHORITY TO PREEMPT 
Let us begin by focusing on congressional intent.  In that case, the 
combination of statutory preemption language with a broad delegation of 
rulemaking authority to an agency might lead us to conclude that Congress 
meant the agency to be able to define the preemptive scope of the statute.  
But what if a statute grants an agency broad rulemaking authority but in-
cludes no language regarding preemption?  Should we read the plain lan-
guage of a general delegation of rulemaking authority as subsuming 
anything an agency chooses to do, including declaring that state law frus-
trates federal goals?  I suggest that we adopt a presumption against agency 
preemption.  Such a presumption makes sense because it reduces the risk 
that agencies will possess excessive power to preempt state law; it also is 
most consistent with Congress’s likely intent. 
 
59  546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
60  See id. at 257–60.  The court reasoned that the agency had only limited powers to issue rules re-
lating to “registration” and “control,” and that the agency accordingly lacked the authority to define 
standards of medical practice.  
61  See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228–29 (2001); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 
212, 222 (2002) (mentioning an agency’s “power” as relevant to the extent of judicial deference af-
forded to agency legal interpretations). 
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A. First-Line Arguments from Congressional Intent 
First, one might infer that an agency lacks authority to preempt state 
law from the lack of express statutory language authorizing the agency to 
do so.  The argument would be that Congress’s failure to expressly author-
ize an agency to preempt state law generally is going to be a deliberate de-
cision.  For example, with respect to preemption in general, if a regulatory 
statute does not include preemption language, chances are that Congress ei-
ther intended not to preempt state law or did not debate the issue.  Indeed, 
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) re-
ported in the early 1990s that express preemption statutes far outnumber 
express savings clauses.62  That statistic supports the ACIR’s conclusion 
that statutory preemption is on the rise.63  Further, as Roderick Hills has ar-
gued, regulated entities often press for express preemption language, as 
with federal motor vehicle safety standards and fuel efficiency standards.64  
These facts suggest that the default legislative expectation—when explicit 
language is lacking—is no preemption.  That same assumption should carry 
over to the agency setting: if Congress does not intend preemption, Con-
gress should be held not to intend agency preemption.  The Supreme Court 
has applied a similar approach in the setting of the avoidance canon.  In 
general, the Supreme Court declines to “lightly assume that Congress in-
tended to . . . usurp power constitutionally forbidden it,”65 and thus will 
choose an available constitutional construction of a statute over an uncon-
stitutional one.  That canon has been extended to assume that just as Con-
gress generally does not intend to usurp constitutionally forbidden power, 
“Congress [also] does not casually authorize administrative agencies to in-
terpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority,” especially 
where the interpretation “alters the federal-state framework.”66  
We might draw similar conclusions from the characteristics of the leg-
islative process.  If the widespread understanding of general delegations to 
federal agencies was that agencies would thereby obtain the authority to 
 
62  See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATUTORY 
PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND ISSUES 14–15 (1992), 
available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-121.pdf (identifying 439 federal pre-
emptive statutes, compared with 34 statutes either clarifying state and local authority where preemption 
might otherwise result or reducing preexisting federal preemption). 
63  See id.  
64  See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Leg-
islative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007). 
65  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988).   
66  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 
(2001).  Admittedly, that case involved both a potential alteration of the state-federal framework and a 
constitutional question involving Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  As with the “clear statement” 
doctrine, however, where Congress is assumed, absent a clear statement, not to wish to present a court 
with a constitutional question, the presumption against preemption amounts to an assumption that Con-
gress does not wish the courts to preempt state law absent a clear statement.   
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preempt state law, state agencies and state organizations likely would seek 
savings clauses more often, just as they get involved when statutory provi-
sions expressly preempt state law.67  The relatively small number of savings 
clauses suggests that such an understanding of the meaning of these general 
delegations is not the widely held one.  Finally, Congress drafts legislation 
against the backdrop of the presumption against preemption, which has 
been a well-established canon of construction in judicial opinions for sev-
eral decades.68  It is reasonable to think that legislative drafters would be 
aware of and attentive to the operation of such a canon.69  Accordingly, if 
the legislative default is not to preempt state law, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that Congress would not wish agencies to preempt state law either.70 
B. General Delegations of Authority and Institutional Competence 
Although these arguments weigh in favor of carrying the presumption 
against preemption into the agency setting, there is surely a serious re-
sponse based on the general delegation itself.  One might say that in dele-
gating general power to an agency, Congress must have intended for the 
agency to make the choices required to implement the program success-
fully.  If state law preemption would make the program better achieve con-
gressional goals, so the argument would go, perhaps it makes sense to 
assume that the agency—a specialized, knowledgeable institution—should 
be able to declare the law preempted.  So, on the one hand, Congress likely 
does not intend to preempt state law; on the other hand, Congress wants its 
agencies to carry out its programs effectively, which might sometimes mean 
the preemption of state law. 
It does not answer the question simply to say that because such a dele-
gation of authority to an agency is general, it should be read to cover any 
sort of agency authority, including  preemption.  Despite their phrasing, as 
discussed in greater detail below, general delegations of authority have 
never been read as truly limitless.71   
 
67  E.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the debate around a bill authorizing the De-
partment of Homeland Security to set chemical plant security standards). 
68  See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231 (1947); Napier v. Atl. Coast R.R. Line 
Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (“The intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police 
power must be clearly manifested.”).   
69  See also Victoria Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 575, 600–05 (2002) (suggesting that legislation is often drafted with knowledge of the various 
canons of construction). 
70  As I have discussed elsewhere, the presumption against preemption could be defended as an as-
sumption about the median legislator’s preferences, but it also may well represent the Judiciary’s own 
emphasis on preserving state regulatory autonomy and federalism, and the related goal of avoiding inci-
dental statutory interference with state regulatory autonomy.  Mendelson, supra note 15, at 747–50, 758.  
Similarly, reading an agency’s authorization broadly to allow it to preempt state law would risk the same 
sort of incidental interference with state regulatory autonomy and with the balance of state and federal 
power. 
71  See infra text accompanying notes 111–15.   
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There are several strong reasons not to stretch a broad delegation to in-
clude the authority to declare a state law preempted.  To see this, first con-
sider some of the justifications for the presumption against preemption of 
state law.  Federalism advocates suggest several reasons to protect state 
autonomy to regulate.  First, we may value the authority of states to respond 
to particular preferences held by their residents.72  For example, a state’s 
residents may value highly the ability to be informed of potential dangers 
presented by consumer products.  Second, federalism, including a state’s 
enactment of its own laws, also may stimulate citizen participation in self-
governance, on the theory that it is easier to participate at a level of gov-
ernment closer to one’s home.73  Third, state policymaking experiments can 
be a useful source of information to other states and to the federal govern-
ment.74  For example, to address climate change, seven northeastern states 
have formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to limit power plant 
carbon dioxide emissions.75  Continuing its historic leadership in regulating 
automotive pollution, the California legislature has voted to institute the 
first-ever limits on greenhouse gas emissions from cars.76  Sixteen states—
representing a third of the new car market—have stated that they will adopt 
the California standards.77  Besides the other states that are following Cali-
fornia’s lead, the federal government has begun to consider regulating mo-
 
72  See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) (arguing that federalism is best justified “because preferences for 
governmental policy are unevenly distributed among the states and regions of the nation, [so] more peo-
ple can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking”). 
73  See, e.g., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[F]ederalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to par-
ticipate in representative government.”); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1510 (1987) (“The federal government is too distant and its compass 
too vast to permit extensive participation by ordinary citizens . . . .”).  But see Frank Cross, The Folly of 
Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2002) (suggesting that “federalist” values are really values of 
localism). 
74  E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing states as “laborator[ies]”). 
75  The states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Ver-
mont.  See Lucy Kafanov, Climate, Deluge of Comments Delays Release of RGGI Rule, GREENWIRE, 
July 24, 2006. 
76  See Dan Berman, Supreme Court “Pre-Emption” Cases Cast Shadow over Enviro Regs, 
GREENWIRE, Oct. 5, 2007.  Shortly before this Article went to press, the Environmental Protection 
Agency denied California the required waiver for its motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards 
under the Clean Air Act.   See Environmental Protection Agency, California State Motor Vehicle Pollu-
tion Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 
and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).  California is seeking judicial review.  See Alex Kaplun, Climate: Calif., 
Groups Sue EPA over Waiver Decision, E&E NEWS PM, Jan. 2, 2008. 
77  See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard.cfm 
(last visited May 11, 2008).  This covers over one-third of the new car market.  See Berman, supra note 
76. 
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tor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions.78  Fourth, preserving a significant de-
gree of autonomy for state governments divides power and can be seen as 
part of the Framers’ efforts to ensure that no single government institution 
accumulates too much authority.79   
Beyond these arguments in favor of state regulatory autonomy, a num-
ber of scholars argue that state regulators serve as participants in a national 
dialogue on appropriate policy, spawning a sort of competition between 
federal and state governments.80  By drawing attention to problems missed 
by national regulators and by choosing solutions different from those of na-
tional regulators, state regulators can prompt the public to hold the national 
government more accountable for its chosen solutions or for inaction.81  For 
example, the actions of states on climate change, where the federal govern-
ment has lagged, have not only helped inform national action, but also have 
prompted a louder call by the public for such action.82 
By requiring a showing that Congress clearly wishes to preempt state 
law, the presumption against preemption erects an additional barrier before 
state law can be held to be preempted and thus gives some protection to 
state regulatory autonomy.  Beyond this, the presumption also helps assure 
that legislative decisions to preempt are thoughtful and deliberate rather 
than simply “incidental.”83  The presumption thus increases the chance that 
interested parties—especially state governments or associations of state of-
ficials—will be involved in any process that results in the preemption of 
state law.  Where does agency preemption fit in?  Compared with statutory 
preemption, the sort of agency preemption I describe above could result in a 
far quieter, but still highly significant, interference with state autonomy to 
regulate.  Moreover, agencies possess great discretion to implement their 
programs under current regulatory statutes.  Combining that statutory dis-
cretion with current approaches to preemption could result in an agency 
possessing the authority to preempt nearly any relevant state law that makes 
a policy choice different from that made by the agency.  The potential 
 
78  See, e.g., Alex Kaplun, Energy Policy: White House Fuels Plan Not Likely to Alter Congressional 
Agenda, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, May 15, 2007.  
79  E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (the rights of the people are best protected in a 
system in which federal and state governments control each other); Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solici-
tude for State Dignity, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, at 81, 89 (noting the argument 
that the existence of states serves as a check against the excessive assertion of power by Congress).   
80  See generally Robert Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999); Hills, supra note 64, at 2–3.  
81  See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental 
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 163 (2006) (“[States can] ‘check’ the interest group capture of policymakers at 
the federal level.”). 
82  See Hills, supra note 64, at 2–3; Schapiro, supra note 80; cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering 
States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74 (2005) (“The genius in having 
multiple levels of government is that if one fails to act, another can step in to solve the problem.”); 
Engel, supra note 81, at 168–69. 
83  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 755.  
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breadth of that power, combined with the typical lack of agency expertise 
on federalism issues, strongly supports the adoption by courts of a presump-
tion against agency preemption. 
Consider current statutes delegating power to federal agencies.  Federal 
agencies typically are not tasked with single-mindedly following one goal, 
but instead are instructed to balance that goal against other concerns (such 
as cost minimization).  For example, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
the EPA is to set maximum contaminant levels in drinking water.  The EPA 
is to identify not only the “goal”—the level at which “no known or antici-
pated adverse effects on the health of persons occur”—but to identify a 
standard that comes as close as possible to that goal after feasibility and 
cost are taken into account.84 
These sorts of standards are widely recognized as increasing the 
agency’s discretion to choose among possible regulatory standards.  Where 
a statute requires that, for example, both health benefits and costs be con-
sidered, an agency decision will be upheld by the courts as long as the 
agency gave actual consideration to the particular goals.85  An agency’s dis-
cretion is broad even under the most determinate-sounding requirement a 
statute could set—that calculated benefits of a particular standard exceed 
calculated costs.  The agency can set a standard that provides a large benefit 
(perhaps accompanied by a large cost, but one that is less than the benefit) 
or a small benefit (accompanied by a small cost that is less than the benefit).  
For example, in setting effluent limits for conventional water pollution, the 
EPA is directed to base the limits on the best conventional pollutant control 
technology by considering a laundry list of factors: the “reasonableness of 
the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and 
the effluent reduction benefits derived, . . . the age of equipment and facili-
ties involved, the process employed, . . . and such other factors as the Ad-
ministrator deems appropriate.”86  Under many circumstances, an agency 
might have more overall discretion under such a statute than under a provi-
sion such as section 109 of the Clean Air Act, which requires the EPA to set 
national ambient air quality standards “requisite to protect public health” 
with “an adequate margin of safety.”87 
Not all goals, of course, have equal status.  For example, the primary 
goal of Clean Water Act pollution limits is to improve environmental qual-
 
84  See 42 U.S.C. 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2000). 
85  See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971). 
86  33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (2000). 
87  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).  That reconciling a multiplicity of goals can increase, rather than 
reduce, an agency’s discretion was recognized by the D.C. Circuit.  E.g., Int’l Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 
665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (looking at safety and feasibility does not adequately “cabin[] the agency’s 
discretion” for nondelegation doctrine purposes). 
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ity.88  One could not say that the goal of the Act is to reduce cost or increase 
flexibility.89  These latter goals are best understood as subsidiary, selected to 
moderate the primary one.  Similarly, although the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act does place limits on the FDA’s ability to set food safety stan-
dards, the primary goal is to increase food safety.90 
Even when a statute contains a clear primary goal, agencies are often 
asked to moderate their implementation of it.  For example, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration is charged with promulgating oc-
cupational safety and health standards that are “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-
ployment.”91  And the Clean Air Act section quoted above does not author-
ize the single-minded pursuit of public health, but instead requires the 
agency to temper its standard—only that standard “necessary” to protect 
public health, and no more.92 
The sorts of agency preemption analyses described above are notable 
because the agency declares the state law preempted based on these coun-
tervailing or moderating goals of the statute, rather than the primary ones.  
An early example of this sort of approach—an approach followed in many 
of the examples cited above93—is the Department of Transportation’s suc-
cessful Supreme Court argument in favor of preempting state tort law in 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.94  In the Geier case, the Transportation 
Department argued to the Supreme Court that in not requiring airbags in all 
cars and instead requiring a “gradual passive restraint phase-in,” it had bal-
anced safety (the primary goal of the statute) with flexibility to use alterna-
tive restraint systems, hence increasing public acceptance of the new 
requirements and (relatedly) reducing costs to consumers by reducing 
manufacturer costs.  Even though the more stringent demands of state tort 
law might serve the statutory goal of safety, the Department of Transporta-
tion argued successfully for the first time in litigation—the argument did 
not appear in the rulemaking—that a state tort claim for defective design 
would undermine the (conflicting) goal of flexibility.95  The argument that 
 
88  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. . . .  [I]t is the national goal that the 
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters [is to] be eliminated by 1985 . . . .”). 
89  Cf. id. (mentioning neither cost nor flexibility). 
90  E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2000) (defining adulterated food, which can be the subject of FDA en-
forcement, as bearing any “poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health”).  
91  29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2000) (emphasis added). 
92  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001) (noting that the standard 
requires protection “not lower or higher than is necessary”). 
93  See supra text accompanying notes 28–51.   
94  529 U.S. 861 (2000).  See also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).  
In Buckman, the Supreme Court found a state law claim based on fraud-on-the-FDA to be preempted in 
part because it might interfere with the FDA’s ability to take a “measured” response to monitoring the 
information filed with the agency.  Id. at 349–53.   
95  Geier, 529 U.S. at 881–82. 
102:695  (2008) A Presumption Against Agency Preemption 
 713 
state tort law served as an “obstacle” to the goals of federal law and was 
thus preempted succeeded despite an express statutory savings clause for 
common law.96 
If agencies are permitted to follow the approach of Geier, they could 
freely preempt relevant state law by pointing to any statutory goal that 
might be undermined by state law.  An agency can nearly always identify 
some statutory goal—perhaps opposed to or in tension with the statute’s 
primary goal—with which the state law will conflict.  For example, imagine 
that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), in order to serve its 
statutory mission of protecting consumer safety, recalls all garden hoses 
leaching levels of lead over fifteen parts per billion into water.97  Lead can 
present a threat to people who might drink from the hose or swim in pools 
filled with water from it.  The CPSC might take the position that the recall 
level balances the need for flexibility in garden hose manufacturing with the 
need to protect people from the neurological effects of lead ingestion.  One 
could imagine that the CPSC, if it possessed a general delegation of rule-
making authority, could attempt to declare preempted a state law that un-
dermines consumer safety, for example, by allowing companies to credit 
costs of required recalls against their state income taxes.  If a Geier-type 
approach were followed, though, one could also imagine a hypothetical 
CPSC attempting to preempt a more protective state law—say one that 
seeks, as California law does, to require labeling of garden hoses that leach 
more than five parts per billion lead98—on the ground that it undermines a 
federal choice in favor of garden hose manufacturing flexibility. 
The examples given above all represent Geier-type approaches.  For 
example, in the FDA’s pharmaceutical labeling preamble statement, the 
FDA argued that its regulatory goal was to inform consumers (the thrust of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act labeling provisions), but only in 
a reasonable way.99  Too much information, the FDA reasoned, could be 
bad by possibly deterring consumer use of valuable drugs.  Because state 
tort law could require more information, albeit in the service of safety, it 
thus would undermine this goal.100 
 
96  The relevant savings clause appears at 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (2000) and states that “[c]ompliance 
[with the federal standard] ‘does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.’” 
97  E.g., ABC News, Dangerous Lead Levels Found in Some Garden Hoses, July 12, 2007, available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Consumer/story?id=3369894; see also Louise Story, Lead Paint 
Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000 Toys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at C1 (describing manufacturer’s 
voluntary recall). 
98  See, e.g., News Release, Center for Environmental Health, Lawsuit Wins Protection for Children 
from Lead Risks in Garden Hoses (Aug. 9, 2004), http://www.cehca.org/news.htm.  
99  See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biologi-
cal Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3930–31 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601 
(2007)). 
100  The FDA’s goal of avoiding misbranding, which it also identified, does not justify implied pre-
emption.  While false labeling claims surely are to be avoided, they are already prohibited by federal 
misbranding requirements.  To the extent state tort law or state labeling requirements could be under-
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In the Transportation Department’s “roof crush” rulemaking, the 
Transportation Department argued that state tort law, although it might con-
ceivably increase roof safety, would subvert secondary goals against which 
the Transportation Department was balancing safety, including minimizing 
costs and dedicating resources to other automobile safety issues.101  And in 
the Department of Homeland Security’s proposed rule on antiterrorism 
chemical plant safety, the agency argued that although state law could con-
ceivably increase chemical plant security notwithstanding the threat of ter-
rorist attacks, state law could undermine the federal interest in preserving 
chemical facility flexibility.102 
Of course, the agency would have to meet the usual requirements of 
reasoned decisionmaking.103  Because statutes often contain significant 
numbers of “moderating” goals to which an agency could point, however, 
that might not be a strong constraint.  Again, the Transportation Depart-
ment’s argument in Geier supplies an example.104  In short, under this sort 
of reasoning and these sorts of statutes, federal agencies would have the 
power to preempt nearly any state law operating in the same arena as the 
federal law, as long as the agency can explain how the state law strikes a 
different balance of statutory objectives than the federal approach does.  
The result would be that at the agency’s option, nearly any federal regula-
tory decision could become a unitary standard.  The agency’s program, rule 
by rule, could systematically come to occupy the field.  Any state standard 
stronger than the federal one might be too costly, too informative, too over-
protective, or possibly “unreasonable” (because, of course, the agency will 
say its own decision is “reasonable” within the meaning of any such statu-
tory requirement).  The agency would thereby transform a federal standard 
that otherwise might leave space for some state law into one that eventually 
leaves space for none.105  This is particularly striking in areas such as con-
                                                                                                                           
stood to require misbranding, they would be preempted in any event as directly conflicting with federal 
law. 
101  See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223, 
49,245–46 (Aug. 23, 2005) (proposed rule). 
102  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 (Dec. 28, 2006) 
(proposed rule) (“A state measure frustrating this balance [between security and flexibility] will be pre-
empted.”).  The final rule was less explicit, but still preserved the Department’s ability to make future 
arguments of this type.  Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,727 (Apr. 
9, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule). 
103  Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (vacating a 
Transportation Department decision for failure to consider options developed in earlier rulemaking 
documents). 
104  See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
105  See also Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 36 
(2005) (arguing that courts should find obstacle preemption of state law when the state law upsets a 
“delicate federal balance” set by Congress or by federal regulators in ratemaking, labor, and pharmaceu-
tical cases). 
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sumer safety and regulation of in-state facilities, areas where states tradi-
tionally have been active. 
The risk of interference with state regulatory autonomy imposed by 
agency preemption thus is especially pronounced.  For example, courts con-
sider “field preemption” claims, where a state is foreclosed from regulating 
altogether, to be very significant.  A court will only rarely find that Con-
gress has “occupied the field”—when the federal regulatory scheme is “so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.”106  The agency decisions discussed so far do 
not claim “field preemption.”  As a practical matter, however, the decisions 
do, one by one, amount to a slow occupation of the field.  This interference 
with state regulatory autonomy is significantly broader and more pro-
nounced than it is, for example, in the case where it is impossible to comply 
with both state and federal regulation. 
Moreover, this sort of complete preemption particularly impedes the 
usefulness of state regulatory autonomy.  For example, recent scholars writ-
ing on federalism point out the value of having overlapping state and fed-
eral regulatory regimes.107  There, the benefit claimed for federalism 
includes the overall improvement in policy that can come from state and 
federal regulators “competitively” attempting to address a particular prob-
lem.108  The agency “obstacle” preemption described above, however, cuts 
back on that interaction.  The agency takes the position that it has struck the 
correct balance among all the countervailing matters of policy, and so any 
different position taken by a state government is preempted as an “obstacle” 
to federal law.  Voilà, no competition.  As William Buzbee has argued, 
even partial “floor” preemption of state law still leaves significant room for 
states to respond to their citizens’ different policy preferences and to reduce 
the ill effects of regulatory process pathologies at the federal level.109  Com-
plete preemption, of course, leaves no room. 
States can, of course, complain that their regulatory autonomy is being 
cut back, as all fifty states publicly did in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.110  
However, even when states can raise the visibility of the preemption issue, 
what they continue to lose (or partially lose) while a preemption question is 
being determined is their ability to demonstrate their preferred policies by 
example.  For instance, states might otherwise have been able to write con-
sumer protection laws that apply to mortgage lenders, require more exten-
 
106  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).   
107  See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text. 
108  See supra notes 72–82; see also Hills, supra note 64.   
109  See generally William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Preemption: Risk, Regulation, and the Floor/
Ceiling Question, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (arguing that while floor preemption still allows states 
to respond to poor federal regulatory decisions, complete preemption eliminates the states’ ability to re-
spond). 
110  See supra note 3 (noting that Michigan challenged the agency’s position directly, and the other 
forty-nine states’ attorneys general filed amicus briefs). 
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sive labeling for risks presented by consumer products, or, through the tort 
system, hold manufacturers responsible for failing to disclose more infor-
mation to consumers about foods or drugs. 
Beyond interference with state autonomy, the breadth of this agency 
preemption also raises legitimate questions about whether Congress can be 
assumed to have intended it.  It seems hard to imagine that Congress would 
wish a general rulemaking delegation to include the power to do away with 
any relevant state law.  A general delegation of authority to an agency is 
never intended to be completely limitless, of course.  For example, a gen-
eral statutory delegation to an agency would not carry with it an authoriza-
tion to the agency to bypass other federal laws (or to interpret them as 
impliedly repealed by the general statutory delegation), no matter how ef-
fective that might make the program.111  Nor would a general statutory dele-
gation be perceived to carry with it the power to regulate in a way that 
raises constitutional questions.112  The Supreme Court has stressed that an 
agency’s general authority to issue such interpretations is particularly dubi-
ous where an “administrative interpretation alters the federal-state frame-
work by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.”113  
Indeed, courts have sometimes found that general delegations of authority 
represent less power for the agency than a specific (and presumably more 
thoughtfully contemplated) delegation represents.114  Moreover, if state or-
ganizations anticipated that statutory language generally delegating author-
ity to an agency could also grant the power to preempt state law, they would 
likely object vociferously during the legislative process.115 
These sorts of agency actions are inconsistent with the concerns under-
lying the presumption against preemption because of the quality of agency 
deliberation.  One might say that agency preemption does not raise the same 
sorts of concerns as statutory preemption because agencies, unlike Con-
 
111  E.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(declining to defer, under Chevron, to agency views on implied repeal); cf. Tyler v. United States, 929 
F.2d 451, 456 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to defer to an agency interpretation that would work an implied 
repeal); Monongahela Power Co. v. Alexander, 507 F. Supp. 385, 392 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that the 
Army Corps lacked jurisdiction to act under section 404 of the Clean Water Act because the Clean Wa-
ter Act did not impliedly repeal the Federal Power Commission Act). 
112  See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
172 (2001) (“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’[s] 
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”). 
113  Id. 
114  See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (noting that for a regulation re-
lying only on general authority to “‘prescribe all needful rules’ . . . . [,] ‘we owe the interpretation less 
deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or pre-
scribe a method of executing a statutory provision’” (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2000); Rowan Cos., 
Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981))); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 
(1979). 
115  Cf. Hills, supra note 64, at 28 (“Any default rule, whether in favor of or against preemption, 
might create incentives for the interest groups hurt by the rule to reverse it in Congress.”). 
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gress, could thoughtfully deliberate every time an issue of state law pre-
emption arises.  As a consequence, we might not need a presumption 
against preemption to prompt deliberation.  To the contrary, however, the 
evidence suggests that agency preemption is not likely to be well consid-
ered.  Again, one reason for the presumption against preemption is to en-
sure that states and the federal government participate in a real dialogue 
over whether state law should yield to federal law.  I have argued elsewhere 
that agencies have some incentives to consider state interests in deciding 
whether state laws should be preempted.  To summarize my analysis, agen-
cies may have political incentives to respond to state interests because they 
are accountable to the President, the winner in a national election.116  Fur-
ther, because agency rulemaking is generally done through a notice-and-
comment process, state organizations possess a formal ability to comment 
on agency rulemaking.117 
However, agency deliberations on preemption are impeded by some 
important obstacles.  Although state institutions have the opportunity to 
comment on rulemaking through the notice-and-comment process, those 
comments are likely to be lower-visibility, both to decisionmakers and to 
the public, than objections raised by a member of Congress to a legislative 
proposal.118  For example, the objections of the New Jersey congressional 
delegation to the Department of Homeland Security receiving the authority 
to preempt state law may have ultimately resulted in the statute containing 
no language preempting state law119—compared with the less successful 
comments of state organizations received in opposition to the Department 
of Homeland Security’s regulatory proposal that claimed the authority to 
preempt state law.120 
Possibly more importantly, agencies, unlike Congress and the courts, 
are specialized institutions that are not set up to consider state autonomy 
concerns.121  This may be partly because an agency exercising a general 
 
116  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 769–77. 
117  See id. at 777–78. 
118  E.g., Hearings on Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and 
State Authority Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2935 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy) (calling administrative preemption “little known”).  
119  Perhaps reflecting the lack of consensus on the Department’s preemption authority, the legisla-
tive history contains equally opposing statements from individual members of Congress.  See, e.g., 152 
CONG. REC. H7967 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sabo) (“The intention is not to preempt 
the ability of the States.”); 152 CONG. REC. S10,619 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Sen. Voi-
novich) (“I feel strongly that this provision sets that uniform set of rules and in so doing, impliedly pre-
empts further regulation by State rules or laws.”). 
120  The final rule, of course, maintained the Department’s claim to authority to preempt state law.  
See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,727 (Apr. 9, 2007) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule).  Again, Congress revised the rule by statute.  See supra note 7. 
121  I argued in Chevron and Preemption that despite Congress’s regional structure, the political in-
centive of agencies—supervised, as they are, by the only nationally elected officials in the federal gov-
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delegation of authority simply is not given guidance on how to weigh state 
regulatory autonomy against other concerns.  Agency authorizing statutes 
are, instead, generally focused on the specific goals of the program the 
agency is asked to implement. 
Federal agencies do, of course, possess considerable program-related 
expertise, and that can be relevant to the question of state law preemption.  
Agencies may be in a good position to see issues that might justify preempt-
ing state law in favor of a federal one, such as cross-border effects.122  
Agencies might also be able to see whether multiple state laws—such as 
laws involving design standards—might lead to an unworkable system for 
regulated entities.  Finally, agencies have an incentive to and actually do 
consult with state and local entities on many aspects of their proposed poli-
cies, including the workability of particular proposals and special regional 
issues. 
Despite possessing a national vantage point and specialized expertise 
on issues of program compliance and implementation, agencies typically 
appear to lack competence on broader aspects of state interests.  As an insti-
tution with a specialized focus, an agency is not likely to possess the 
broader institutional mission, or the expertise necessary, to consider the ap-
propriate balance of authority between the federal government and the 
states or the benefits of preserving some degree of state autonomy.  In my 
earlier article, I argue that this lack of expertise weighs against according 
agency interpretations presumptive deference under a doctrine such as 
Chevron.123  
Arguments about the lack of institutional competence apply with equal 
force where the issue is the authority of agencies to preempt state law.  Be-
cause agencies lack an institutional focus on the value of retaining an inde-
pendent state role and preserving state sovereignty, courts should be 
reluctant to read a statute to authorize an agency to declare state law pre-
empted. 
In my earlier article, I presented evidence that although federal execu-
tive agencies are required to prepare “federalism impact analyses” by Ex-
ecutive Order No. 13132, “Federalism,” and its predecessor executive 
orders, the agencies’ record in doing so is quite poor.  To briefly reiterate 
                                                                                                                           
ernment—to take federalism issues into account is not distinctively poorer than Congress and might, in 
some respects, be superior.  For reasons of institutional competence and expertise, however, I nonethe-
less conclude that Chevron deference should not be available for agency interpretations of a statute’s 
preemptive scope.  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 779–90. 
122  For example, there are strong reasons for federal minimum standards in the environmental area, 
such as the prospect of interstate effects and the possibility that states may “race to the bottom” to attract 
new business.  And state law preemption may be warranted when, for example, high capital costs make 
it prohibitively expensive for an industry to comply with multiple design standards.  Federal motor vehi-
cle safety standards are expressly exclusive; states generally have no authority to set different standards. 
123  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 780–82 (also noting that agencies typically do not look for 
employees with general knowledge of governmental structure). 
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that evidence, rulemaking analyses of federalism issues are rare; a 1999 
Government Accountability Office analysis suggested that agencies had 
prepared only five federalism impact assessments in connection with 
11,000 final rules issued between April 1996 and April 1998.124  My own 
analysis of 600 proposed and final rulemaking documents during one quar-
ter in 2003 revealed only six federalism impact analyses prepared by agen-
cies.  Nearly all were of low quality, failing to analyze state interests in 
providing additional protection for residents, state autonomy, or any of the 
other federalism values described above.  Instead, each ended with the 
agency’s conclusion that it possessed statutory authority to preempt.125 
An updated analysis performed after that article was published sug-
gests that the trend has not improved significantly.  In May 2006, a search 
among 485 proposed and final rulemaking documents revealed six rules or 
proposed rules with preemptive effect on state laws.  Only three of the six 
documents concluded that any federalism impact assessment was required.  
Only one of those impact assessments went beyond stating either that the 
agency concluded that it possessed statutory authority to preempt or that the 
document had been made available for comment, including to state offi-
cials.126  On the positive side, however, three of the rulemaking documents 
did indicate some special effort made by the federal agency to contact state 
agencies for comment.127  However, at least one state organization recently 
commented that “there is no incentive for agencies to adhere . . . [to the Ex-
ecutive Order, and] overall agency adherence to its provisions has been 
spotty at best.”128  The examples described in Part II also do not show any 
significant inclination by agencies to take state interests seriously.  Take the 
FDA labeling preamble.129  The FDA prepared a “federalism impact analy-
sis,” but that analysis primarily focuses on the FDA’s position that it pos-
 
124  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (May 5, 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/
gg99093t.pdf. 
125  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 783–85.   
126  The document concerned credentials for transportation workers in industries handling hazardous 
materials.  See Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the Maritime 
Sector; Hazardous Materials Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers’ License, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,396 
(May 22, 2006) (proposed rule).  The Department later decided not to preempt state law.  See Transpor-
tation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the Maritime Sector; Hazardous Ma-
terials Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers’ License, 72 Fed. Reg. 3492, 3575–76 (Jan. 25, 2007) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of C.F.R.) (final rule). 
127  See Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from Certain Foods and Coronary Heart Disease, 
71 Fed. Reg. 29,248, 29,250 (May 22, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2007)); Hazardous Materials 
Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers’ License, 71 Fed. Reg. at 29,436; Taking of Marine Mammals 
Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan (ALWTRP), 
71 Fed. Reg. 26,702, 26,704 (May 8, 2006) (temporary rule). 
128  Hearings, supra note 118 (testimony of Rep. Donna Stone, President, National Conference of 
State Legislatures). 
129  See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.   
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sesses “considerable institutional expertise” and “comprehensive statutory 
authority,” and that different (e.g., more protective) state rules would “dis-
rupt” the federal program.130  It contains no discussion of state government 
concerns that state law preemption issues might raise.131  Indeed, some crit-
ics have indicated that states could not reasonably have anticipated the pre-
emption and submitted comment because the FDA’s proposed rule stated 
that it would have no implications for federalism or state law.132  The Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures has further complained that the 
FDA resisted its requests to consult and file comments.133  The FDA’s fail-
ure to consider these issues is particularly striking given recent concern re-
garding the quality of the FDA’s performance.  At the time of this writing, 
for example, the FDA has been sharply criticized for inadequate enforce-
ment of food and drug laws;134 for failing to adequately monitor postap-
proval information about pharmaceutical side effects;135 and for granting a 
number of premarket drug approvals.136  One might argue that state regula-
tory autonomy would be especially valuable to help generate a public dia-
logue on pharmaceutical regulation or to supplement the FDA’s efforts.  
By the same token, the Department of Homeland Security’s draft 
chemical security rules have been criticized for not requiring facility owners 
to consider safer chemicals and practices—referred to as “inherently safer 
technology.”137  Nonetheless, not only did the agency take the position that 
it could declare preempted more protective state standards, but the agency 
also gave no consideration to state interests.  Instead, the agency reasoned 
only that the threat of terrorist attacks “remains a significant national 
threat,” implying that state regulatory autonomy is limited to issues that are 
 
130  See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio-
logical Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3969 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601 
(2007)). 
131  The FDA noted that states had not commented on the proposed rule document, but that docu-
ment contained no agency position that state tort law would be preempted.  See id.   
132  See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 118, at 7 n.13 (testimony of Prof. David Vladeck); see Require-
ments on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological Products, 65 
Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000) (proposed rule). 
133  See Hearings, supra note 118 (testimony of Rep. Donna Stone, President, National Conference 
of State Legislatures). 
134  See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., PRESCRIPTION FOR 
HARM: THE DECLINE IN FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY (2006).   
135  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA’S 
POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS (2006). 
136  The nonprofit Public Citizen has argued that the FDA has inappropriately approved several 
drugs or failed to withdraw them from the market promptly.  See Public Citizen, FDA Fails to Protect 
Americans from Dangerous Drugs & Unsafe Food, Watchdog Groups Say (June 27, 2006), 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2227; see also Hearings, supra note 118, at 11–15 
(testimony of Prof. David Vladeck) (discussing shortcomings in the FDA’s program). 
137  See Democrats Oppose DHS Plan to Preempt State Chemical Security Rules, ENVTL. POL’Y 
ALERT, Jan. 17, 2007.  
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uniquely local, not national.138  It then cited the Supremacy Clause for the 
position that state law must “give way to federal statutes and regulatory 
programs.”139  The agency gave no consideration to whether states might 
have legitimate interests in stricter standards, interests including a concen-
trated population, a large number of chemical plants, or simply a stronger 
preference for more safety.  This is particularly striking in view of strong 
opposition to state law preemption articulated by the state of New Jersey.140  
In the final rule, although the Department of Homeland Security said it did 
not intend any current law to be preempted, and although it engaged in an 
extensive discussion of its own authority to preempt state law and “conflict 
preemption” principles, it did not pay any particular attention to state inter-
ests as such.141 
Finally, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was criticized by 
the Government Accountability Office for failing to consult adequately with 
state officials prior to taking the position that federal law preempted the ap-
plication of state consumer protection laws to state-chartered subsidiaries of 
national banks engaged in mortgage lending.142 
The failure of agencies to consider the value of state autonomy and in-
volvement unfortunately appears to be typical.  That suggests we should be 
concerned about the institutional competence of agencies to make the call 
about the correct balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments.  Even if agencies possessed more internal expertise on such issues, 
their authorizing statutes typically do not give them criteria regarding how 
to balance these concerns against the goals of the programs they implement.  
This makes an agency’s task far more difficult and nearly precludes mean-
ingful judicial or congressional oversight. 
Of course, it is possible that Congress might wish to give an agency the 
specific authority to preempt state law, along with guidance on when and 
how to do it.  Congress has, on rare occasions, done so.143  Without such 
clear authority and guidance, however, agencies do not seem to possess the 
expertise or institutional focus to decide when state laws are appropriately 
preempted. 
 
138  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,292 (Dec. 28, 2006) 
(proposed rule). 
139  Id. 
140  See supra note 5.   
141  See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688, 17,726–28 (Apr. 9, 2007) 
(to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27) (final rule) (containing federalism impact analysis, but not discussing 
either particular state interests or more general state interests in maintaining regulatory autonomy).  
142  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION RULEMAKING: OPPORTUNITIES 
EXISTED TO ENHANCE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS AND BETTER DOCUMENT THE RULEMAKING 
PROCESS 19–20 (2005). 
143  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (referencing 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2000)). 
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Agency consideration of state interests is likely to be impeded for other 
reasons as well, including the prospect of agency bias.144  By deciding that 
state law is impliedly preempted by its regulatory decisions, an agency 
might thereby make itself the sole regulator.  Perhaps it could then demand 
a larger budget or be better able to deliver on its promises to special interest 
groups.  Although agency tendencies in this direction might be outweighed 
by the desire of officials to limit the agency’s bureaucratic workload—or to 
serve public interest—the possibility of agency bias still weakly weighs 
against readily finding agencies authorized to preempt state law.145 
Relatedly, to find state law not preempted using the implied preemp-
tion analyses described above, an agency would have to confront the possi-
bility that it has struck a less-than-perfect balance of the statute’s regulatory 
objectives.  Although self-examination and revisiting one’s own decisions 
are, of course, features of good decisionmaking processes,146 an agency may 
be unwilling to concede or to recognize the prospect that its own regulatory 
efforts are imperfect.  This embarrassing position could be avoided if the 
agency simply elects not to discuss preemption at all.  Where, however, an 
agency faces pressure to preempt state law, the strong incentive is for it to 
take the position consistent with defending its own substantive regulatory 
decision as correct.  Indeed, an agency might be concerned that recognizing 
the virtues of different state approaches would expose its own decisions to 
challenge as arbitrary and capricious.147  Consequently, we should be con-
cerned that an agency’s institutional focus and mission may not equip it to 
fully consider state interests. 
Finally, the lack of statutory guidance to agencies is worth special 
mention.  If courts read general delegations of statutory authority to author-
ize agencies to impliedly preempt state law, that authority could be ex-
tremely broad.  This is not to say, of course, that the agency would have 
completely unbounded authority to preempt state law.  The agency would 
still have to exercise its authority in a reasoned way, consistent with the 
relevant concerns of the statute, and its action would still be subject to judi-
cial review to ensure that it is not “arbitrary” or “capricious” under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.148  Thus, an agency could not preempt a 
 
144  This argument builds on the position I took earlier in Chevron and Preemption, Mendelson, su-
pra note 15, at 794–97.  In that article, I argued that self-interest weakly weighs against giving Chevron 
deference to an agency interpretation of preemptive statutory language.  
145  Arthur Wilmarth has made this argument with respect to the OCC’s efforts to preempt state laws 
that might apply to national banks.  See Wilmarth, supra note 37, at 295 (arguing against application of 
Chevron deference). 
146  See Buzbee, supra note 109, at 1596–97 & nn.170–71 (discussing “experimentalist” approaches 
that can minimize regulatory pathologies). 
147  Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (vacating a 
Transportation Department decision for failure to consider options developed in earlier rulemaking 
documents). 
148  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
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particular state’s law because, say, the governor happens to be a political 
opponent.149 
Nonetheless, these general delegations of rulemaking authority do not 
provide adequate guidance to agencies on when to declare state law pre-
empted.  As I argued earlier in opposition to Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of preemptive statutory language, without express preemp-
tive language, statutes generally do not give guidance to agencies on how to 
evaluate state interests in regulatory autonomy or on the need to preserve a 
division of regulatory authority between the federal and state govern-
ments.150  This lack of statutory guidance is reflected in agency analyses that 
largely fail to consider these interests. 
Nor do the statutes give judges adequate criteria with which to review 
the agency action.  This problem is particularly pronounced when an agency 
declares that state law stands as an “obstacle” to federal goals.  With con-
flict preemption, by contrast, a court can review to see if compliance with 
both state and federal standards is indeed a physical impossibility.  But with 
implied preemption of the Geier type, all the agency need say is that it be-
lieves it has struck the right balance of the statutory goals, including moder-
ating or countervailing goals.  Any different position taken by a state might 
“undermine” federal policy and hence be preempted.  As long as the 
agency’s own regulatory decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to 
law, it is hard to imagine any implied preemption position that would not be 
immune from judicial vacatur.  All this will tend to significantly reduce 
agency accountability for decisions to preempt state law, and with it, the le-
gitimacy of the agency actions themselves.151 
In theory, accountability might be had in other quarters.  For example, 
on occasion, Congress could respond to agency preemption as it did when 
the Department of Homeland Security staked out a claim to preempting, 
among other things, New Jersey’s approach to increasing security of chemi-
cal plants.  (Ultimately, however, the response primarily just protected New 
Jersey law; the federal agency appears to be maintaining its claim to declare 
a state law preempted.)  Both White House and congressional checks on 
agency activity, however, tend to be ad hoc and unsystematic.152 
By contrast, if courts applied a presumption against agency preemp-
tion, agencies would be more likely to function with greater statutory guid-
 
149  Cf. Nat’l Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 877–78 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (overturning the EPA’s setting for pesticide tolerance in mangoes due to its reliance on the irrele-
vant factor of the health of foreign economies).   
150  See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 791–94. 
151  See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 
1284 (1984) (observing that various models of administrative agencies are aimed at characterizing bu-
reaucracies as being “under control”). 
152  See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New 
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 570–71 (2003) (discussing the ad hoc nature of congressional 
oversight). 
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ance and thus with more accountability for their actions.  A presumption 
against agency preemption would, of course, mean that an agency could not 
be assumed to have the authority to preempt state law unless there is clear 
evidence that Congress so intended.  In the course of drafting express lan-
guage, Congress would be more likely to supply criteria to the agency re-
garding when state law should be preempted.153  That would tend to protect 
state laws and state regulatory autonomy from “incidental” interference.  In 
addition, it would contribute importantly to guiding the work of agencies, 
increasing the extent to which agencies can be held accountable for their 
decisions, and in turn, the increasing the legitimacy of administrative ac-
tions.  Some statutes already expressly authorize agencies to preempt state 
law; in the absence of such language, courts would need to determine 
whether Congress clearly intended agencies to preempt state law under the 
circumstances at hand.  
Suppose preemption approaches changed, and Geier-type arguments 
were no longer acceptable justifications for finding that a state law stands as 
an obstacle to federal law.  Perhaps, one might argue, state law should be 
preempted—by a federal agency, for example—only if it stands as an ob-
stacle to the primary goal of the federal statute.  For example, a court of ap-
peals found that a Pennsylvania law barring attorneys who were not 
members of the state bar from opening offices in the state was preempted as 
an “obstacle” to an attorney’s federal authorization to practice law in fed-
eral courts located in that state.154  And a Texas law disallowing the sale or 
possession of horsemeat for human consumption was found not to be pre-
empted by the primary purpose of the federal meat inspection laws, even 
though those laws allow the sale of horsemeat.155  Unlike Geier, these 
analyses focus on the primary goal of the federal law (or authorization) in 
deciding whether state law is preempted as an “obstacle” to federal law.  In 
such a world, an agency presumably could find state law preempted only if 
the state law would undermine the primary federal regulatory goal (for ex-
ample, disclosure of pharmaceutical risks in the FDA case and automobile 
safety in the roof crush standards example and in Geier itself).  This type of 
analysis would limit agency discretion to preempt state law and thus reduce 
concerns about the extent of the agency’s discretion.  To the extent an 
agency declared state law preempted as interfering with a primary goal of 
federal law, such preemption would be closer to “floor” preemption, still 
 
153  Indeed, a flat delegation of authority to an agency to preempt state law without guidance could 
under some circumstances be unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of legislative power.  See gener-
ally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (discussing “intelligible princi-
ple” required to find valid delegation).  Even if the nondelegation doctrine poses no bar, the presence of 
preemption authority likely would motivate state organizations to seek specific criteria to guide and limit 
agency decisions.   
154  Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2006). 
155  Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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leaving some regulatory autonomy to states.156  On the other hand, such a 
regime still would permit agencies to preempt state law without guidance 
from a statute, and preemption decisions still might be made by institutions 
without any institutional focus upon the value of state autonomy.  The ap-
plication of a presumption against agency preemption, by contrast, still 
might usefully prompt Congress to more explicitly guide agency preemp-
tion decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Adopting a presumption against reading statutes to authorize agency 
preemption is, of course, facially consistent with the presumption against 
preemption.  In addition, without such a presumption, these special purpose 
institutions may possess virtually limitless discretion to declare state law 
preempted as an obstacle to federal goals, a result Congress did not likely 
intend.  Moreover, agencies may be rendering these decisions notwithstand-
ing their lack of institutional competence.  Finally, placing this discretion in 
the hands of federal agencies is consistent with neither adequate respect for 
state regulatory autonomy nor a vital state-federal dialogue on regulatory 
policy.  By comparison, a presumption against agency presumption is likely 
to result in more explicit congressional decisions on when agency preemp-
tion decisions are appropriate and what criteria should guide them.  Asking 
Congress for that guidance may not only result in a more thoughtful focus 
on state regulatory autonomy, but may also help improve the administrative 
process. 
 
156  One could, in theory, argue that some statutes privilege multiple primary goals.  Suppose some 
of the banking statutes have the purposes of both protecting consumers and preserving financial market 
liquidity.  If so, an agency might have greater latitude to “balance” those goals and preempt state law 
that strikes a different approach.  Such a regime still would be problematic, however, because of the lack 
of statutory guidance addressing the importance to be placed upon state regulatory autonomy.   
